

Although the politics-administration dichotomy model has frequently been presented as historically important but conceptually and empirically faulty, the criticisms have missed two fundamental points. First, it is not—as commonly presumed—the founding theory of public administration in the United States but rather a poorly grounded characterization of the early literature that took hold in the late 1950s. The term dichotomy was rarely used before that time and never used by the “founders” of the field who were supposed to have invented the model. Second, there is an alternative model of complementarity that has been present in the literature from Wilson onward. It stresses interdependency, reciprocal influence, and extensive interaction between elected officials and administrators along with recognition of the need for distinct roles and political supremacy. The politics-administration complementarity model—elaborated here with references to the “old” public administration literature prior to 1960—offers a strong foundation on which we can build.

COMPLEMENTARITY OF POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION AS A LEGITIMATE ALTERNATIVE TO THE DICHOTOMY MODEL

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The relationship of administration to the political process is the key issue in defining the scope and nature of public administration. There is ample but commonly ignored evidence that our common view about the development of the field in the United States is a creation myth—“in the beginning was dichotomy.” The myth is not the dichotomy per se but that it was the founding theory of public administration.

A careful reading of commentaries on the development of the field indicates that we should know that the founders of the field did not advocate a dichotomy. There is reversion to this discredited intellectual history, in part because of scholarly laxness but also because of the absence of an

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alternative interpretation of the themes emphasized in the "first" half century and the second quarter century of public administration literature in the United States. In the beginning were efforts—incomplete, imprecise, and inconsistent to be sure—but serious efforts to define how a potentially powerful corps of administrative officials would constitute itself and interact with elected officials and the public. From the beginning there were attempts to reconcile the inherent tensions of administration in a democratic society—*independence and control, honesty and obedience, influence and deference, responsibility and compliance*—rather than an approach that emphasized only the second half of each pair. From the 1880s through the 1950s, there is a persistent theme that represents an implicit model of complementarity of politics and administration even though the dichotomy model also rose and fell during the late middle portion of this period.¹ The heritage of public administration in the United States can be rediscovered by identifying the historical basis for complementarity and elaborating what it means as an enduring organizing concept for the field.

The central argument can be summarized simply. Public administration as a separate and coherent field began in the second half of the 19th century through a process of separation and differentiation even though the origins of public administration can be traced back much farther in time (Rutgers, 1997). In Europe, the first step was to differentiate the administrator from the executive (Rutgers, 1998). In the United States, the challenge was to separate the administrator from politicians and elected officials, as well as to explain how practices associated with authoritarian regimes in Europe could be incorporated into a democratic process. The major theme in the conceptualizing that occurred in the United States—the public face of the new public administration model—was separation. It stressed the seemingly absolute difference between politicians (*partisan and responsive*) and administrators (*nonpartisan, neutral, and scientific*), the strict division into separate spheres of activity (*policy and administration or execution*), and the clear subordination of administrators to politicians. The minor theme of interconnection, articulated from the beginning, altered the nature of the relationship. Together they form the complex model of complementarity. The development of public administration was part of the larger reform effort to strengthen governance (Meier, 1997; Svara, 1994), which entailed reinforcing changes in both the political process and administration. The separation theme was dominant prior to the forties, but a review of the literature will

demonstrate that most major early contributors to the field recognized the interconnections as well as the separation.

The *complementarity of politics and administration* holds that the relationship between elected officials and administrators is characterized by interdependency, extensive interaction, distinct but overlapping roles, and political supremacy and administrative subordination coexisting with reciprocity of influence in both policy making and administration. Complementarity means that politics and administration come together to form a whole in democratic governance.

Two important developments gave an exaggerated prominence to dichotomy and obscured complementarity. First, the major theme of separation was extended during the orthodox period in the 1920s and 1930s into an argument for complete separation as part of the emphasis on scientific management and principles of administration. Politicians and administrators, it was claimed, occupied separate spheres. These features matched the characteristics of a dichotomy between politics and administration, although the term was not used widely at the time. Second, although the field was moving away from the extreme position of the 1930s and reemphasizing the theme of interconnection (which had never disappeared) in the 1940s and 1950s, the term *dichotomy* emerged in the late 1950s as the expression of choice to characterize not only the thinking of the orthodox period but of all earlier public administration thinking in the United States. The term captured only the major theme in the development of the field and ignored the minor theme. The "politics-administration dichotomy" construct as articulated by Wallace Sayre in 1958 was broad in scope, and it was accompanied by the argument that a sharp separation without the web of interconnections was intended from the beginning. The rich intellectual heritage of the field was reduced to a cliché.

The status of the dichotomy as we now understand that term is clear: It was an "aberration" (Svara, 1998). Golembiewski (1977), Rabin and Bowman (1984, p. 4), Van Riper (1984, pp. 209-210), and Rohr (1986, p. 31), among others, have shown that a *distinction* stressed by Wilson and Goodnow hardened into a *dichotomy* around the 1920s.² These founders stressed the concepts of insulation and neutrality (O'Toole, 1987; Schultz, 1994) but not a comprehensive model of dichotomy that would preclude close interaction of administrators and elected officials, administrative influence in policy, and extensive administrative discretion. Martin (1952), close to the developments he described, summarizes the dynamics of change during the 1920s and 1930s superbly:

In the atmosphere provided by scientific management, a mechanistic concept of public administration came to prevail widely and in important circles. Administration was separated severely from the legislative body, toward which its spokesmen frequently manifested not only impatience but also profound distrust. "Politics" was anathema—not the politics practiced by administrators, but the politics of the "politicians." (p. 667)

This constellation of ideas and attitudes is the heart of the dichotomy, and it emerged well after the initial founding period as an intellectual detour for the field. Furthermore, despite our view of the 1920s and 1930s as the "high noon of orthodoxy" (Sayre, 1958, p. 103),³ there were many who presented an alternative view in the 1930s, and reexamination proceeded apace in the 1940s. In local government, the original rationale of the council-manager form is not consistent with the dichotomy. Special forces—as well as currents in public administration generally—reinforced the emergence of the ideas associated with dichotomy as the official doctrine of the International City Management Association (ICMA) in the 1930s, but at this level of government as well, a broader perspective quickly reemerged in the 1940s (Svara, 1998).

The concern here is to discover how the dichotomy, which we commonly accept to be an "ancient proverb" (Peters, 1995, p. 177), came to be viewed as foundational. In the process of identifying other perspectives in the literature, we discover the alternate model that gives the field a more solid foundation.

The discussion is divided into three sections. First, there is a search for the term dichotomy in the literature of public administration. Second, the discussion goes back through the literature starting with Wilson to examine the evidence for complementarity. Third, the discussion concludes with an exposition of a model of complementarity based on early statements about the nature and values of the field of public administration.

IN SEARCH OF THE ORIGINS OF THE DICHOTOMY: WHO USED THE TERM AND HOW?

The term dichotomy was not used by the early writers who are supposed to have invented it. Furthermore, it was not used commonly, if at all, as a label for the model of strict separation before 1940, even during the 1920s and 1930s when the ideas we associate with the dichotomy were dominant.⁴ It appeared in the 1940s and 1950s, but the scope of the

concept was limited—with one exception in 1949—until 1958 when Sayre used it to characterize thinking in public administration up to World War II. Friedrich's (1940) vehement attack on Goodnow did not use the term, but his exaggerated critique fostered the notion that early writers had promoted strict separation. Although Friedrich acknowledged that the distinction between politics and administration is useful "as a relative matter of emphasis," he claimed that Goodnow made it "an almost absolute distinction" and "an absolute antithesis" (p. 6). Such a complete division of functions would indeed constitute a dichotomy. Friedrich's criticisms are to some extent warranted, but, like many who would follow, it appears that he needed to savage—and misrepresent—the work of early contributors to the field to enhance his own arguments.

EARLY USES: DICHOTOMY AS A CONVENIENT DISTINCTION

In the 1940s and 1950s before Sayre's article, I have found seven sources in which the term is used, two written by Waldo. From the way the term is treated, the long-standing importance of the separation theme is evident. However, dichotomy is only one of several terms used to refer to it, and two of these sources also suggest that reciprocal influence of administrators on policy makers accompanies dichotomy. Vieg is one of these. In the text edited by Morstein Marx (1946), he used the term in a positive sense and equated the "dichotomy of ends and means" with the "dichotomy of politics and administration" in government. He acknowledged that members of the executive—"administrators-in-chief and their principal subordinates"—carry a "double load" in both policy formulation and implementation, although most administrators are involved only in the latter.⁵ Admitting "relativities" such as this, the dichotomy still refers to a "useful distinction" in part because it focuses the attention of citizens on elected officials who "alone are called upon to determine and declare policy" (p. 8). Administrators should neither try to substitute their own preferences for those of elected officials nor publicly advocate positions. "The time," he advised, "for administrators to record their doubts is at the stage of policy consideration or reconsideration. Here they will usually be heard with full appreciation of their judgement." Still, despite exercising influence behind the scenes, he concludes,

The public service has much to gain and nothing to lose from observing the implications of the dichotomy of politics and administration. To the degree that administrative officials make clear by word and deed that they regard themselves principally as agents of policy, the public will be likelier to

confine itself to the control of policy in the legislative arena, leaving administration free to do its work without direct political interference. (p. 9)

Thus, dichotomy, despite the problem of executives who span boundaries and administrators who anonymously influence policy, was a useful shield and was presumably preferable to a word like *distinction* because of the dramatic emphasis the term conveyed.⁶

WALDO'S LIMITED USE OF DICHOTOMY

Waldo (1948) used a variety of terms to describe the relationship between elected officials and administrators. He referred to the politics-administration "formula" (pp. 115, 121, 208), "distinction" (p. 116), "notion" (pp. 115, 123), and "axiom" (p. 110), as well as simply "politics-administration" (pp. 75, 207) used alone. It seems significant that dichotomy was not one of the terms chosen. This suggests that it was not commonly used in the late forties as the label for a general model. There are two uses of the word in *The Administrative State*. In the discussion of separation of powers, Waldo observes that "Willoughby as well as Goodnow is preoccupied with a dichotomy between politics and administration, and Goodnow as well as Willoughby recognizes a function of 'administration' apart from and in addition to the 'executive' proper" (p. 114). Certainly both found it a challenge, for the reasons noted by Vieg, to classify the elected executive in a separation-of-powers form who is both politician and administrator and, therefore, struggled to identify what was essentially administrative in the work of the executive branch.⁷ The second use of dichotomy in *The Administrative State* was in a subheading (p. 123) in the discussion of a 1933 article by Gulick. Gulick rejects what Waldo characterizes as a "false dichotomy," although Gulick does not use the term in his article, which argues that administrators are involved in making policy decisions.

Waldo (1948) does not interpret Goodnow as an advocate of a simplistic separation of politics and administration and notes that "some more recent students have taken the name of Goodnow in vain" (p. 109). He does, however, reinforce the tendency to lump together most of the preceding literature and associate it with strict separation. In his summary, Waldo criticizes the "strait jacket" public administration has made for itself—"the instrumentalist philosophy of the politics-administration formula" (p. 208) and suggests that the main tenets of the public administration movement emerged in the decades preceding 1914 (p. 211). Only now

is the field "freeing itself" from this view "that has limited its breadth and scope." Thus, although he does not use the term dichotomy in a general sense, he views the field as confined to a definition that approximates it.⁸

IDENTIFICATION OF DICHOTOMY IN SIMON

Two sources use the term in connection with discussion of Simon (1947), although Simon himself neither uses nor supports the concept of dichotomy.⁹ Appleby (1949), who like Waldo concludes that the literature in the 20th century "tended to accept as substantially real a separation of powers which excluded from administration any—or at least any important—policy-making function" (p. 3), refers to Simon's fact-value distinction as "another dichotomy." It "appears to be sort of reincarnation of the early search for a line between policy-making and administration" (p. 17). Long (1954) expressed concern about the same point. Efforts to establish a value-free science of administration could have the "unintended and logically unwarranted result of reviving the policy-administration dichotomy in new verbiage" (p. 22).

LATER LIMITED USES

In 1949, Albert Lepawsky attributed a dichotomy of politics (and policy) and administration to Wilson and Goodnow. He noted exceptions to a strict line of division but argued that the dichotomy model helped prevent political interference (p. 50). Like Vieg, he saw the dichotomy as convenient for this purpose but objected to it as a barrier to policy involvement. He calls for a more accurate definition of the role of administrators, that is, they should gather facts and prepare findings, inform (with their chief's approval) the policy-making body or the public, and "recommend and initiate policies but advocate them only with superior consent" (p. 75).

Gulick in 1955 expressed similar sentiments and used the term dichotomy in discussing the need to make full use of experts in government. As they apply their knowledge, foresight, values, and character to government, "the old dichotomy between 'politics' and 'administration' breaks down." He concluded that a new doctrine should be developed that makes the fullest possible use of the expert in "an appropriate framework of political and professional responsibility." Gulick was simply reasserting his theme from 22 years earlier, not undertaking a thoroughgoing critique of what he considered to be the traditional view.

SAYRE AND THE FULL EMERGENCE OF THE DICHOTOMY MODEL AS FOUNDING THEORY

Wallace Sayre's "Premises of Public Administration" article in 1958 is different in kind from the preceding ones. He attacks a model with completely separated roles that he labels as the dichotomy¹⁰ and challenges the intellectual foundation of public administration itself. Sayre goes beyond Waldo and Lepawsky in collapsing the literature of public administration up to that point into a very simple view. He argues that the textbooks by White in 1926 and Willoughby in 1927, summarizing those who had come before, "codified the premises, the concepts, and the data for the new public administration" (p. 102).¹¹ The first feature of the codification was the "politics-administration dichotomy" that was "assumed both as a self-evident truth and as a desirable goal" (p. 102). White and Willoughby perceived administration to be in a "self-contained world of its own, with its own separate values, rules, and methods."¹² Sayre argues that responsiveness of administrators to the public was not seen as a problem "because everyone then understood that politics and policy were separate from administration, which was concerned exclusively with the execution of assignments handed down from the realm of politics" (p. 103). He did not cite any dissenters to the premise that administration has no involvement in policy until the Morstein Marx textbook in 1946.¹³ Sayre repeats the observations noted earlier that Simon helped to challenge the science of administration but replaced the "orthodox politics-administration dichotomy" with the "new fact-value dichotomy" (p. 104).

By presenting this simplistic interpretation of the prewar literature and labeling it as the *politics-administration dichotomy* (a term repeated three times in the four-page article), the concept achieves a prominence and takes on a life and power of its own. Complex and diverse ideas were reified into a simple mechanical model.¹⁴ Landau (1962) referring to Sayre, notes that "in concretizing the concept of administration, equating it with a single branch or agency of government, a dichotomy was formed that was inevitably to be repudiated" (p. 17). The alternative that Sayre presents is not simply a political interpretation as provided by Appleby but a political science interpretation. He notes that many political scientists had been skeptical all along of the dichotomy—"the keystone of pre-war orthodox public administration" (p. 103). Now the idea that administrative agencies and their staffs were involved in politics was finding support "within the public administration fraternity itself" (p. 103). His "emerging reformulations" are useful questions to guide more behaviorally oriented research. He concludes, however, by going beyond Gaus's (1950, p. 168)

call for combining a theory of politics and a theory of public administration—an article not cited by Sayre—to assert that “public administration is ultimately a problem in political theory” (p. 105). Waldo (1990) would later observe that the politics-administration dichotomy represents the gap between political science and public administration, each of which defends one side of the dichotomy or the other (pp. 73-75). Whereas Gaus argued for widening the bridge between the two fields, it appears that Sayre was burning the bridge.

In a period of increasing tension between political science and public administration (see Fesler, 1957; Martin, 1952; Redford, 1961), Sayre contrasts the foresight and insight of the former with the slower realization of the latter of the political implications of administrative action. Sayre did not simply say that public administration should recognize the political significance of administrative behavior—as Appleby (1949) did when he defined administration as the “eighth political process” or Bosworth (1958) did when he asserted that the “manager is a politician.” He suggested that public administration had advocated a dichotomy and failed to observe phenomena that contradicted it. As we shall see, he inappropriately interprets the early literature and ignores a substantial body of research that identifies interactions between politics and administration even if it does not use the new terminology of behavioral political science with its emphasis on politics as a distributive process. Thus, Sayre goes further than previous authors in linking dichotomy with intellectual deficiencies of the field that extend back to Wilson via White and Willoughby.

GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE DICHOTOMY AS FOUNDING THEORY

This is a watershed. From this point forward, the view that public administration is *based on the simple dichotomy* takes hold. At first it is tentative. Davidson (1961) cites Sayre and notes that “the usefulness of the concept of administration as separate from politics has been questioned” (p. 853). Kroll (1962), who cites Sayre (p. 381), suggests that “in establishing a dichotomy between policy and administration, the early writers in public administration have perhaps done an unconscious disservice to the careful conceptualization of policy” (p. 383). Nigro (1965) referred to the “unfortunate dichotomy between administration and politics which characterized early writings in the field of political science” (p. 15). Loveridge (1968), who noted that the dichotomy was “embraced by early writers” but now “wholly rejected in academic circles,” referred

readers to Sayre for a "succinct perspective" on the topic (p. 215). The New Public Administration declared that the dichotomy is "dead, but the ghost continues to haunt us" (Lambright, 1971, p. 333). Public administrationists accepted the premise that the dichotomy was part of the "theology" of public administration (Wilbern, 1973, p. 277) or one of the "defining pillars" of the field (Henry, 1975, p. 380). Henry presented the dichotomy starting with Goodnow's work as the original paradigm in public administration. Scholars in public administration had uncritically accepted the existence of a comprehensive dichotomy model—neither so labeled nor so broad before 1958—and the notion that the dichotomy was the founding theory in public administration.

These views reinforced the association of public administration research with oversimplification, naïveté, excessive reliance on structure, and emphasis on the prescriptive rather than the empirical and contributed to the general decline in the status of public administration as a field (Henry, 1975). Public administration came to be treated with at best "indifference" and often "undisguised contempt or hostility" within the political science discipline (Waldo quoted in Henry, 1975, p. 382). This treatment cannot be attributed entirely to the way the field was conceptualized but it appears to have been an important cause. "The dichotomy," Kettl (1993) concludes, "ultimately has led many within political science to abandon the unruly child of public administration" (p. 407). It appears that political science saved public administration from itself. For example, Aberbach and Rockman (1993) note that "analysis by political scientists effectively brought into question the conceptual and practical reality of the politics/administration dichotomy" (p. 5). Bearing the burden of the dichotomy as its presumed founding concept has given public administration an inferiority complex that remains to this day.

CONSEQUENCES

There are three consequences to identifying a simplistic dichotomy as the founding theory of public administration. First, many public administration textbooks convey the notion that the intellectual foundation of the field is simplistic and erroneous. Lane (1994) is typical: "From the beginning, Wilson's dichotomy greatly oversimplified reality" (p. xvii). He goes on to assert that the dichotomy is not valid today and may have never been valid. Others who express similar views are Gordon (1986) who attributes to Wilson, Goodnow, and White the "advocacy of a politics-administration dichotomy model" (p. 26); Henry (1989, pp. 21-22);

Starling (1993, p. 35); Lutrin and Settle (1992, p. 6); Meier (1993, p. 49); and Rosenbloom (1993, p. 16).¹⁵ It is not surprising that most of our students and the practitioners we have educated accept the dichotomy as gospel and that they are confused about how to cope with it as a discredited but lingering concept.

A second consequence has been both to weaken conceptualizing and research. Scholars posit the dichotomy as the norm and then (re)discover its deficiencies. It is easy to construct alternative models that appear strong in contrast to the simplistic dichotomy, for example, Van Wart's (1998) "strong" versus "weak public administration" paradigms (pp. 189-191). From empirical studies, we learn again and again that city managers are involved in policy making (e.g., Ammons & Newell, 1988), but not how they are involved, or conclude that policy involvement is part of "role reversal" by local administrators (Morgan & Cass, 1993) even though there are conceptual and empirical grounds for a longstanding policy role (Svara, 1989a). Alternatively, scholars criticize the original model and then seek to resurrect parts of it (Svara, 1985), modify it to make it relevant to current conditions (Montjoy & Watson, 1995), or sanitize it (Frederickson, 1997, pp. 227-228). The problem is not in their observations but in the strain to link them to the dichotomy concept. Presumably we make this effort because the concept supposedly has historical significance. Ironically, we perpetuate the dichotomy-as-founding-theory myth by our tortured efforts to salvage the term. Although the dichotomy is rejected, public administration research has tended to focus only on how bureaucracies implement policy rather than how public administration interacts with electoral institutions and contributes to governance (Meier, 1997, p. 194) or on public administration's instrumental rather than constitutive role (Cook, 1996).

A third consequence is a need to identify an alternate source of legitimacy. Mosher (1968) asserted that, with the demise of the dichotomy, "the finding of a viable substitute may well be the number one problem of public administration today" (p. 6). This search is made more difficult because we seemingly cannot use the ideas of early contributors to the field—ideas that have been discredited by the faulty association with the dichotomy model.¹⁶ Because it seems that we cannot go home again—because we view the field as misfounded and misgrounded (Wamsley, 1996, p. 362), we look for a new home in regime values, agency perspective, citizenship, or the law. These are helpful additions, but they should be used to augment an organizing idea for the field that has been present from the beginning. This is the concept of complementarity. It

better captures the intent of the founders of the field than the dichotomy and summarizes themes that are found extensively in the literature through the 1950s.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF COMPLEMENTARITY

There are many examples in the public administration literature prior to 1940 of efforts to blend politics and policy making with administration, to identify how administrators support elected officials, and to articulate the policy role of administrators. These reflect the minor theme of inter-connection that accompanied the major theme of separation and have been forgotten or ignored. In addition, there is a far wider range of proponents for reversing the major and minor status of these themes between 1940 and 1958 than Sayre acknowledges. Because Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and Leonard White as well as the founders of the council-manager form of government are so often misunderstood and given credit for a model of strict separation they neither invented nor intended, a review should start with their work. Levitan (1943), who criticized the artificial separation of ends and means in public administration, specifically noted Wilson, Goodnow, and White when he observed that this was not the intent of early contributors to the field. There is "nothing new," he wrote, "in the recognition of an organic relationship between the basic principles as a system of government and its administration" (p. 355). The views of many other contributors to the public administration literature from the 1930s through the 1950s will be only summarized in the interest of conserving space.

WILSON

Wilson (1887) introduced his famous article by stating that "it is the object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency" (p. 197).¹⁷ He promoted the discovery of a distinct place and mind-set for administration in well-known phrases about administration being "a field of business" far "removed from the hurry and strife of politics" (p. 209) and his desire for administration to be seen as a science. He was broadly concerned, however, with "how the law should be administered" not only with "speed, and

without friction" but also with "enlightenment [and] with equity" (p. 198). Public administration is the "executive" side of government, which entails more than simple implementation. Administration ranges from the "activity of the state in individual and small things" (p. 210) to issues of great magnitude. Although it is not concerned with constitutional questions, it does deal with changes that "are merely instrumental to the possibly changing purposes of a wisely adapting convenience" (p. 211). His vision was a powerful (Doig, 1983, p. 294) and "high-profile model of public administration" (Rohr, 1986, p. 66).¹⁸ He saw politics and administration as "organically connected although creating tension" (O'Toole, 1984, p. 152).

The administrator should be controlled and accountable but "not be a mere passive instrument" (Wilson, 1887, 212). He held that "large powers and unhampered discretion seem to me the indispensable conditions of responsibility" (p. 213) in administration. He argued that "there is no danger in power, if only it be not irresponsible" (p. 213). He seems to limit and contain administrators when he asserts that "*policy* will have no taint of officialism about it" because "it will not be the creation of permanent officials" (p. 216). He does not want public opinion to be "meddlesome" or "directly exercised" in the oversight of detailed aspects of administration. On the other hand, "As superintending the greater forces of formative policy alike in politics and administration, public criticism is altogether safe and beneficent, altogether indispensable" (p. 215). His summary model of public administration is both prescient and wide-ranging:

The ideal for us is a civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought, by means of elections and constant public counsel, as to find arbitrariness or class spirit quite out of the question. (p. 217)

Although Wilson may have merely introduced the United States to the "idea of administration" (Stillman, 1973), the idea was rich and complex in its efforts to reconcile contradictions that bedevil responsible, professional administration in a democratic society.¹⁹

GOODNOW

Goodnow (1900) felt that certain aspects of administration were harmed by politics and should be shielded from it. "For reasons of both convenience and of propriety, it is believed that the interpretation of the

will of the state shall be made by some authority more or less independent of the legislature" (p. 73). He argued that

political control over administrative functions is liable . . . to produce inefficient administration in that it makes administrative officers feel that what is demanded of them is not so much work that will improve their own department, as compliance with the behests of the political party. (p. 83)

There is, however, an important aspect of administration that serves to link the political and professional spheres—the executive function or the general executing of the law that “must of necessity be subordinated to the function of politics” (Goodnow, 1900, p. 79). When one moves beyond general execution to specialized administration, “much must be left to official discretion, since what is demanded of the officers is not the doing of a concrete thing, but the exercise of judgment” (p. 81). Goodnow recognized what we would now consider to be political behavior in his assertion that the “mission” of administrators in “semi-scientific, quasi-judicial, and quasi-business” activities is “the exercise of foresight and discretion” and “the pursuit of truth,” as well as gathering information, maintaining impartiality, and promoting efficiency (p. 85). Overall, he observed an interrelationship between politics and administration but one in which roles were differentiated (Landau, 1962, p. 18).

NEW MUNICIPAL PROGRAM: SECOND MODEL CHARTER

The commentary accompanying the second Model Charter for city governments, which endorsed the council-manager form of government, distinguished *legislation* from *administration*, assigning the former to the council and the latter to the manager. The charter stressed the insulation of administrators from interference by elected officials but not isolation. The council would exercise “constant and comprehensive” supervision and consider citizen appeals of administrative “rulings” (Woodruff, 1919, pp. 18-19, 41). According to the commentary, “Administration is given a place apart, but it is not an independent place. It is subject to control but not to factious interference” (p. 155).

The council-manager form is often viewed as the epitome of the dichotomy model, but, in fact, the city manager was expected by the founders of the form to be a leader who offers policy recommendations to the council (Woodruff, 1919, pp. 31, 38, 130).²⁰ The commentary on the second model

charter summarized the view of reformers on the relationship of elected officials and administrators:

They are not two antagonistic elements, each seeking to enlarge its sphere of action at the expense of the other. They are not even independent powers in the government, each working in a distinct field, performing its appropriate acts, and having for these purposes an authority of its own. On the contrary, they are two parts of the same mechanism, or we may liken them to two elements in one chemical compound whose combined qualities give the character to the substance. In a sense, they take part jointly in every act performed. (Woodruff, 1919, p. 37)

WHITE

White (1926) had views that were realistic and complex in contrast to Sayre's (1958) claim that he saw the dichotomy as a "self-evident truth and as a desirable goal" (p. 102). Given the resources of administrators, it is natural that "the influence of the administration has been at times very great in the formulation of legislative policy" (White, 1926, 32). He notes with favor the increasing practice of rule making by administrative experts rather than by laymen, although he acknowledges some popular concern about the growth of administration "controlling in the first instance the application of law to the individual case, cooperating also in the formulation of policy" (p. 33). Although legislative control of administration is important, "it is nevertheless important to remember that the administration cooperates indispensably with the legislature, and that without its assistance, the task of legislation would become much less informed and much less effective" (p. 33). White discusses the potential for administrators to overreach their authority and role because of the leadership they provide.

With the best of intentions, it is difficult for a conscientious administrator always to observe the limits placed by law or by public opinion. The highest type of official will be in the advance guard of public opinion, and will concern himself to educate opinion to the standards which he knows should be applied. (p. 419)

Administrators also may manifest the "traditional evils of bureaucracy" including being "impervious to new ideas that arise outside of the circle of the 'experts'" (p. 420). In his field study of city managers, White (1927) documented their policy contribution while noting that a minority overstepped the bounds of acceptable leadership.

SUMMARY OF OTHER FINDINGS AND CONCEPTS CONSISTENT WITH COMPLEMENTARITY

Other important observations and concepts related to complementarity were common in the literature during the next three decades. Key ideas and their sources can be briefly summarized as follows:

- Administrators and elected officials as interrelated and in equilibrium: Friedrich and Cole (1932/1967, p. 88); Pfiffner (1935)
- Need for administrators to preserve the democratic regime: Herring (1936, p. 397)
- Administrative discretion: Gaus, White, and Dimock (1936); Gulick (1933); Herring (1936)
- Executive side of government including administrators as planners and policy formulators with legislators as vetoers of plans: Gulick (1933, p. 66)
- Elected officials and administrators differ in degree (e.g., more vs. less policy formulating) as well as differ in kind (e.g., amateur vs. professional): Pfiffner (1935)
- Policy role of administrators: Appleby (1949); Finer (1941, p. 342); Friedrich (1940); Gaus et al. (1936); Haines and Dimock (1935); Herring (1936); Hyneman (1939); Long (1954); Morstein Marx (1946); Pfiffner (1935); Price (1941); Waldo (1948)
- Role of legislatures in making exceptions to rules: Key (in Morstein Marx, 1946)
- Interest organizing (Gaus in Gaus et al., 1936), reconciling group differences (Herring, 1936), and interest representation by administrators (Long, 1954)
- Value choices by administrators: Simon (1947, pp. 58-59)
- City managers as community leaders (Stone, Price, and Stone, 1940, p. 247) and politicians (Bosworth, 1958)
- "Inner check" and "ideal of professional obligation" (Friedrich, 1940; Gaus in Gaus et al., 1936), public interest (Herring, 1936, p. 23), and integrity (Morstein Marx, 1946, p. 111; Price, 1941) as guides to administrative value choices

Such a condensed presentation cannot do justice to the richness of the positions taken by scholars in public administration from 1930 to 1960, but it gives a sense of the range and diversity of viewpoints that have been largely forgotten. Price (1941) captures the essence of these views in the way he characterized council-manager relations. His observation is particularly important because it draws on a large field study, the results of which had been published the previous year, and it predates the new realism of scholars who worked in government during the war (noted by

Waldo, 1965). It is unequivocal in identification of the virtual seamlessness between the two parts of the local government system:

The relationship between council and manager is so intimate that it is generally impossible to prove whether the manager is using his own judgement in taking an administrative action or is acting under coercion or threat by the council or some of its members, or whether the council in adopting a policy is following the ideas originated by its members or the advice of the city manager. (p. 573)

Interaction is extensive and influence is reciprocal, but the administrator is guided by professional values. "The city manager like other public officials today," Price argues, "needs to have a weighty sense of responsibility to the ideals of his profession, to the integrity of its purpose, and to the effectiveness of its techniques" (p. 578). Thus, an influential, distinct, and subordinated public administration is central to the political process.

Two commentaries suggest how the field was approaching redefinition in the 1950s. Gaus (1950) saw theories of public administration and politics as interactive. Not only is "a theory of public administration . . . also a theory of politics." In addition, public administration theory and practice informs the study of politics: "Who can better deflate arrogant generalizing about many of the issues" in governmental and policy design than administrators and scholars of administration? (p. 166). He assessed the overall place of administration in social science and society and saw "administration as the essential constituent to any social theory that has purposes over than decorative" (p. 167).

Fesler's (1957) vision for the future of public administration stands in sharp contrast to Sayre's presentation made in the same year and published in 1958. He notes the "swing away from the simple, overly mechanical view of administration" but warns that it could go so far as to be destructive to our understanding of government and to public administration itself (p. 139).²¹ Anticipating the sentiment that would soon become dominant in political science, he notes the argument that "all the *important* problems of administration are really problems of politics" (p. 140). To those who accept this line of reasoning, "the administrative problems that matter are not problems of administration proper. And the administrative problems that don't matter don't matter" (p. 140). He argued, however, in contrast to Sayre, that public administration should not concede the field to political science—or to economics, the behavioral sciences, or business management. His prescription is worth noting.

The student of public administration . . . is confronted by the many-faceted reality that is public administration; he is caught between the over-assurance of the earlier faith in unproved principles and the futility of mere agnosticism; and he is conscious of the interrelations with politics, economics, individual and group behavior, and institutional administration in general. (p. 142)

He called for the field to accept complexity, to "be with caution, bold," and to call upon various disciplinary perspectives to advance understanding of a field that is important in its own right.

This cursory and far from complete review of themes consistent with a model of complementarity demonstrates that public administrationists in the United States have from the beginning struggled to reconcile separateness with interdependency and freedom with control and accountability. The dominant thinking in the 1920s and 1930s was an aberration as public administration sought an extremely high degree of separation from politics and self-contained, scientific bases for decision making. As we have seen, important voices articulated and advanced the theme of interconnection while stressing the need for separation from partisan interference. In the two decades starting in the late 1930s, the perspective that had been overshadowed by the certainty and aloofness of scientific management became dominant. There was not only significant criticism of the orthodox model but also intellectual renewal within public administration. Supporting this resurgence was the formation of the American Society for Public Administration and the creation of a major new channel of research and opinion about the field (Martin, 1952, p. 668).

In the late 1950s, however, the dichotomy emerged in reified form. The aberrational model of the orthodox period that could be aptly characterized as a dichotomy came to be viewed as the original, prevailing, and persisting model of the field. Despite Fesler's warning, public administration was subsumed by political science and would not assert its unique purpose and multidisciplinary perspective for another 15 years (Henry, 1975). Unfortunately, by that time, it had lost its heritage and had accepted the simplistic dichotomy as its shaky foundation.

The stereotype of the dichotomy as founding theory distorted the meaning of early literature and obscured the contributions of later scholars. The limitations of the prewar writings we have reviewed should not be ignored. Through the 1930s, the prescriptions for the administrator's role were often stated in formalistic, stilted language. Many scholars were fastidious about how policy contributions were to be made, and the need for

insulation from partisan politics continued to be stressed. The formal instrumental relationship of administrators to elected officials was emphasized. What later scholars would define as the political implications of policy influence and administrative discretion, as well as the politics within administration, were largely ignored. There was a lingering attachment to distinguishing ends and means, and the new fascination with distinguishing values and facts. These limitations sparked dissent and the calls for new approaches in the late 1940s, as we have seen. There was in the earlier literature, however, also recognition that administrators affected the determination of ends (very discretely in the view of some, openly and fundamentally to others),²² exercised discretion, organized interests and mediated group differences, and made value judgements. Implicitly through the 1930s and clearly thereafter, many scholars stressed the connections between public administration and the political process. At the point in the 1950s when a wide range of voices were engaged in exciting dialogue about this way of looking at the field, the reframed dichotomy had a stifling effect. It is time to give expression to the deeply rooted model that stresses public administration's centrality to governance and complementary relationship to elected officials.

POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION COMPLEMENTARITY MODEL: A PRELIMINARY HISTORICAL STATEMENT

It is not possible to fully develop a model of complementarity here. Rather, the following is an outline of such a model that draws on the literature through the 1950s. This seems the best way to demonstrate that there is a foundation for a challenging model of public administration in its early and middle literature. The "old" public administration provides prescriptions that are remarkably relevant to current concerns. Quotations from the original sources are used to amplify and explain the key points.

1. Administrators have a deep commitment to support elected officials and the democratic process. The basic purpose of public administration is positive—effecting the work of government—and supportive—"administration cooperates indispensably with the legislature" (White, 1926, p. 33). Public administrators support elected officials and citizens in defining and accomplishing their goals for collective action and their constitutional purposes. As reflected in the purpose of administrative study, administrators help determine "first, what government can properly and successfully do, and secondly, how it can do these proper things with the

utmost possible efficiency" (Wilson, 1887, p. 197). Administrators should have as their "most immediate interest the preservation of the democratic regime" (Herring, 1936, p. 397). Administrative support for the realization of democratic principles is essential: "Administrative procedural machinery is much more than a *tool* for the implementation of a political ideology. . . . [It] is an integral *part* of each political ideology—it is part of a system of government" (Levitan, 1943, p. 355).

2. Administrators are committed to obey the law. The potential for self-serving power in administration was recognized from the beginning, but public administration is committed to acting within the law and Constitution. If the law and management considerations are in conflict, the administrator observes the law (White in Mosher, 1976, p. 127).
3. Administrators respect the control of elected officials. They are to be "on tap rather than on top"; independent policy making by administrators is "a new version of taxation without representation" (Finer, 1941, pp. 342, 348). A necessary component of support for democracy and respect for political authority is neutrality in dealings with elected officials and politicians. Administration is subordinate and must show "allegiance to the properly expressed will of the representatives"; this is the essence of "overhead democracy" (Redford, 1958, p. 89).
4. At the same time, there is interdependency and reciprocal influence between elected officials and administrators in policy making. "Only a working partnership between professionals and politicians can supply both the knowledge and the push for the creative adaptations in policy needed in a society in flux" (Redford, 1958, p. 94). Administrators are commonly implementing and interpreting policies they have helped to shape (White, 1926, p. 33). Administrators should be "co-determinants of the fundamental decisions affecting their part of the service" (Friedrich & Cole, 1932/1967, p. 87). Administrators should be leaders "formulating policies and urging their adoption" by elected officials (Woodruff, 1919, p. 130). Administrators are "in the advance guard of public opinion" and seek to "educate opinion to the standards" they know should be applied (White, 1926, p. 419). Indeed, administrators must be careful that they do not foster dependence from, and undercut the authority of, elected officials—reducing the legislature to the "function of a dignified ornament" (Morstein Marx, 1946, p. 107).
5. Administrators exercise discretion based on their own expertise and judgment (Goodnow, 1900, p. 81; Wilson, 1887, p. 213). Administrators' "every act is a seamless web of discretion and action" (Gulick, 1933, p. 61).
6. Administrators are committed to being responsive to the public—to be "intimately connected with popular thought" (Wilson, 1887, p. 217). Administrators should be attentive to "existing preferences in the community, and more particularly its prevailing majority" (Friedrich, 1940, p. 12). At the local level, they are community leaders (Bosworth, 1958, p. 216; Stone et al., 1940, p. 247).
7. Administrators seek to ensure that all interests are heard by fostering the organization of the unorganized (Gaus et al., 1936, p. 38). Indeed, admin-

istrators have a unique contribution to play in speaking for the public: "a vital part of . . . community representation must be structured into administration if [it] is to occur at all" in the policy-making process (Long, 1954, p. 31). Administrators reconcile group differences and make "effective and workable the economic and social compromises arrived at through the legislative process" (Herring, 1936, p. 7). Administrators resist the domination of government agencies by any particular interest (Herring, 1936, p. 384).

8. Administrators expect that elected officials will respect the need for administrators to be insulated from direct intervention by elected officials and elements of the public in making specific administrative and management decisions. Administrators are accountable to elected officials for their decisions, but to be accountable, they must be shielded from narrow political interference in making technical decisions (Goodnow, 1900, p. 81). Insulation does not mean isolation: "Administration is given a place apart, but it is not an independent place. It is subject to control but not to factious interference" (Woodruff, 1919, p. 155). Elected officials exercise "constant and comprehensive supervision" of administration and consider citizens' appeals of administrative decisions (Woodruff, 1919, pp. 18-19, 41). Administrators should respect the need for elected officials to make exceptions to general policy (Key in Morstein Marx, 1946, p. 354). Elected officials and administrators should establish a "working arrangement" to ensure a "proper equilibrium" without "meddlesome" encroachment (Pfiffner, 1935, p. 11).
9. Administrators should maintain distinct roles based on their unique perspectives and values. Administrators should be scientific and knowledgeable. They bring rationality to the policy process that would be missing without their efforts (Long, 1954, p. 31). They are "statesmen" (Bosworth, 1958, p. 216). They are committed to both effectiveness and efficiency.
10. Administrators should be independent and honest in their dealings with elected officials—not a "passive instrument" (Wilson, 1887, p. 212).
11. Administrators have broad-ranging ethical obligations and draw on many sources for ethical guidance, including honesty, commitment to the public interest, integrity, the "inner check," equity, enlightenment, fair-mindedness, impartiality, neutrality regarding party, responsibility and accountability for actions, professionalism/responsibility to the fellowship of science, administrative self-regulation, respect for political supremacy, and commitment to democracy.²³

In sum, the model of complementarity is based on elected officials and administrators joining together in the common pursuit of sound governance. It provides a foundation for current scholars who see public administration playing a more active and political role (Keller & Spicer, 1997). Despite the relatively greater emphasis through the 1930s on separation and subordination, sharing and reciprocity was the reality and the ideal throughout. This summary does not include the dominant rhetoric

supporting a mechanistic separation of politics and administration from the orthodox period of the 1920s and 1930s. It does show, however, that even during this period there were many dissenters and that the development of public administration as a field that interacts with elected officials and the public continued. In the final analysis, complementarity is a larger concept than dichotomy because it can encompass the separate and distinct roles that a complementary relationship entails and the neutrality and insulation that administrators require for accountability. Dichotomy cannot encompass the reciprocity, sharing, interchange, leadership, independence, and professional responsibility that are clearly present in complementarity.

CONCLUSION

Complementarity offers a "stable resolution of the democracy-administration problem" (O'Toole, 1984, p. 157) that the dichotomy could not provide. The orthodox dichotomy model entailed the dependence and compliance of administrators vis-à-vis elected officials and complete separation of their spheres. Administrators would have been confined to technical advice to elected officials on policy matters and implementing the policy decisions of elected officials based on technical expertise with limited discretion. As Long (1954) put it, administration would have been "a neutral instrument solely devoted to the unmotivated presentation of facts to, and the docile execution of orders from, political superiors" (p. 27). This is not a workable relationship nor does it match reality. In actuality, during the orthodox period when the dichotomy model held sway, administrators had "overrun the realm of policy" using the claim of scientific principle to handle "an ever-enlarging complex of phenomena" (Waldo, 1948, p. 57). This adds another curious twist to the story of the dichotomy in the United States. At the time when there seemingly was a dichotomy, public administration was expanding its power behind the shield of separation.²⁴ A separate and autonomous public administration can easily shift from being the dependent instrument to the controlling force, in large part because of its separateness. A complementary public administration, on the other hand, affirms its contributions to governance and acknowledges and supports the democratic process that it complements.

Complementarity stresses interdependency along with distinct roles, compliance with independence, respect for political supremacy with a

commitment to shape and implement policy in ways that promote the public interest, deference to elected incumbents with adherence to the law and support for fair competition, and appreciation of politics with support for professional standards. The issue is not whether public administrators are "instrumental or usurpative" (Heady, 1984, p. 408)—the standard dichotomy versus nondichotomy options—but rather how they are both instruments and contributors to the political process. The interaction between administrators and elected officials is so extensive and the interface is so close that their behavior necessarily affects the political process. The process would be far different if administrators did little beyond filling a management role, just as it is different when they act positively as policy initiators and proponents of professionalism in administration (Svara, in press). It is fitting to use Donald Price's (1941) summary assessment of the council-manager form to express the basic premise of complementarity: Public administrators make "the greatest contribution to policy and administration without even momentary immunity from political responsibility" (p. 578).

This approach to defining the relationship of public administration to the political process draws on an intellectual tradition in American public administration that we have not only forgotten but denied. At the time that public administration was achieving intellectual renewal and recognizing its mutuality with political science, its origins were denigrated and its central, if not always dominant, theme was ignored. As a field, we swallowed the baseless pronouncement that the dichotomy was our founding theory. The long-standing idea of complementarity offers a strong alternative foundation on which we can build.

NOTES

1. O'Toole (1984), who also challenges the emphasis on discontinuities in the literature, offers evidence for a consistent emphasis on "reform" throughout American administrative thought.

2. Denhardt (1984) argues that the dichotomy cannot be dead because it never existed (p. 50). It did exist as the operating model in the 1930s, although he is right in the sense that it was not labeled as the dichotomy at the time. O'Toole (1987) takes the position that the dichotomy was a common and unifying theme from the beginning but that the early versions were more flexible and sophisticated, whereas later versions simplistically divided functions between institutions.

3. As we shall see, Sayre did not view the dichotomy as a product of this period. He overlooked the diverse voices of the 1930s and also misrepresented the earlier literature.

4. I have not exhausted all sources by any means, but I have not found any uses of dichotomy in sources prior to 1940. It seems significant that it is missing from a collection of essays in honor of Goodnow (Haines & Dimock, 1935). Gulick and Urwick (1937) describe a public administration that is separated from the political sphere, but they do not use the term *dichotomy* and simply cite Goodnow on the need for separation. Gulick (1933) had already attacked the idea that administrators do not contribute to policy.

5. Implicitly and explicitly, city managers were included in the executive category. Veig in chapters 1 and 8 (Morstein Marx, 1946) does not include city managers in his list of executives, although he notes that mayors are not executives "when relieved of administrative duties by a city manager" (p. 7). Morstein Marx, on the other hand, observes that governors and mayors have gradually assumed "true responsibility for the executive branch, and the continuous spread of the council-manager plan of municipal government has worked in the same direction" (p. 187).

6. Veig dropped the term dichotomy in the revised edition of the Morstein Marx (1959) text.

7. Goodnow saw the executive as spanning the political and administrative spheres and part of both; this would presumably be true of appointed executives as well, although the prime example of such an executive—the city manager—had not yet appeared on the American scene. Willoughby (1927) distinguishes the president and governor as a chief executive whose function is limited to making certain that the "laws are properly complied with" but has no direct authority over administrative officers—authority that resides in the legislature—(pp. 10-12) and the executive as the "general manager" who has administrative authority *conferred by the legislature to the chief executive* (chap. 3).

8. Seven years later, Waldo (1955) broadened his criticism. He describes the two parts of government (decision and execution) as one of the four "central doctrines of public administration prior to 1940" (along with science, principles, and efficiency) (p. 40) and notes that a "rigid, even dogmatic, separation of politics and administration" was common (p. 42). Later, he labels the "politics-administration dichotomy" as "the genesis of the contemporary value problem," that is, the first simplistic effort to determine who makes value choices in government (p. 60).

9. It is worth noting that Simon (1947) stated explicitly that administrators as well as elected officials make value choices (pp. 58-59). Although "democratic responsibility in modern government" requires approximating a division between legislators and administrators that corresponds to the value-fact division (p. 59), in practice the line is blurred because both elements are present in many decisions. Legislative bodies make many factual decisions and depend on administrators for advice that, in part, reflects values. Furthermore, "since the administrative agency must of necessity make many value judgements, it must be responsive to community values, far beyond those enacted into law" (p. 58). Simon concludes that "it would be naive to suggest that the division of work between the legislature and administrator in an actual public agency will ever follow very closely the lines just suggested" (p. 58).

10. Sayre does not define the term, but he appears to be using a standard definition of dichotomy. The Oxford English Dictionary (1991) defines its use in logic as "division of a class or genus into two lower mutually exclusive classes or genera." Rutgers (1998) is pursuing an alternate line of reasoning by focusing on the epistemological meaning of dichotomies and the logical nature of argument (pp. 6, 10). He argues that dichotomies should not be depicted as "splitting the universe" into two contradictory parts, although he concedes that

this is a common or even dominant use of dichotomies. He proposes treating the elements of the dichotomies as "ideal types" that are opposites but not mutually exclusive. He argues that viewed properly as logical constructs, dichotomies do not preclude the coexistence or contribution of the opposites. In the intellectual history of public administration in the United States, however, the "politics-administration dichotomy" formulated by Sayre does sharply divide the two spheres, and it is this version that has acquired great symbolic importance. Furthermore, the Oxford English Dictionary meaning of *complement* as "either of two complementing parts" seems more appropriate than the revised definition he proposes.

11. In fairness to Sayre, his characterization of Willoughby is correct. The "prime function" of the legislator is "to determine policies and give the necessary orders for putting these policies into effect" (Willoughby, 1927, p. 2). The function of administration is "the putting into effect of policies and carrying out of orders as determined or given by other organs" (p. 11). As we shall see in the next section, however, White has more complex views of the relationship.

12. Whereas Martin (1952) had stressed that scientific management came to dominate public administration for a time, Sayre lumps them both together.

13. Whicker, Strickland, and Olshfski (1993) note that Morstein Marx and Waldo made the "first, of many, assaults" (p. 531) on the politics-administration dichotomy, although they do not cite Sayre. In fact, Waldo (1948) discussed the "rise of heterodoxy" in the thirties that contributed to a "newer theory" that disagrees "not with politics-administration itself; only with the spirit of rigid separatism" (p. 121).

14. Landau (1962) used this term as well in referring to the two concepts (p. 18). I prefer to think of the dichotomy model as a reification of the whole relationship consisting of simplistically defined parts. It is not clear when Landau believes this happened. On one hand, he refers to the "ancient dichotomy." On the other hand, he argues that if Goodnow's observation of the interrelationship of politics and administration or Gulick's (1933) suggestion that politics and administration be seen as specializations rather than absolute differences had been followed, "the two concepts would not have been reified and there would be no need to 'repudiate' them" (p. 18).

15. Textbook writers who do not express this view include Johnson (1992), Rehfuss (1989), Graham (1993), and Stillman (1996). Denhardt (1995) refers to the "supposed" dichotomy as one of the "oldest issues" (p. 19).

16. O'Toole (1987) shows the value of sorting out the components of the thinking of early generations of reformers to identify useful ideas even though the "dichotomy has collapsed" (p. 23).

17. Van Riper (1984, 1997) has shown that the early influence of Wilson's article does not match its present-day fame. Because it is so common, however, to link the dichotomy model to this article by Wilson, it is important to examine its content carefully.

18. Rohr (1986, p. 67) equates this view with a dichotomy, although to him the essence of the concept is the combination of subordination and autonomy without the "naïve view of administration as apolitical."

19. Rohr (1986, chap. 5) is critical of Wilson for contradicting constitutional principles of separation of powers in favor of a parliamentary form of government. He also notes Wilson's conservatism and his view that assigning tasks to an independent administration would check democratic excesses.

20. Richard Childs also viewed city managers as innovators who would lead their communities into "great new enterprises of service" as he told the city managers at their meeting in 1918 (quoted in White, 1927, p. 143).

21. Fesler (1957) was only half correct in his prediction that "one can not now make a useful career of harassing the ghosts of Wilson, Goodnow, and Willoughby" (p. 139). Careers have been advanced by doing so, although one can appropriately question the usefulness of the efforts.

22. As we have seen, Vieg and Lepawasky urged a behind-the-scenes approach, and Finer (1941) conceded that "no one in their right mind would deny the importance of suggestions persuasively presented by the expert" (p. 342). Herring (1936), on the other hand, felt that the "balance of power is shifting" to administration (p. 22), and Price (1941) asserted that anonymity for the city manager in policy leadership was impossible (p. 573). Van Wart's (1998) "strong administrative model" has the same quaint tone of the former fastidious group when it "encourages career public administrators to (confidentially but strongly) advise elected officials about policy decisions" (pp. 190-191).

23. Just as we have been blinded to the policy involvement of administrators in early decades, we have assumed that ethics was not a concern then. The notion that administrators are fully controlled, neutral agents without the need for ethical responsibility is a logical deduction from a fallacious model.

24. Newland (1989) argues that the same thing happened during this period at the local level where the dichotomy reinforced the hidden accumulation of power by the city manager.

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